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,t\fghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State

Barnett R. Ru bin
United States Institute of Peace
When Afghan exiles in Pakistan convened a shura (council) in Islamabad to choose an interim government on February
10. 1989. they were only the most recent of exiles who have
aspired and often managed to Mrule" Afghanistan. The seven
parties of the Islamic Union ofM ujahidin of Afghanistan who had
convened the shura claimed that. because of their links to the
mujahidin fighting inside Afghanistan. the cabinet they named
was an Minterim government" rather than a Mgovernment-in exile. ~ but they soon confronted the typical problems of the latter:
how to obtain foreign recognition, how to depose the sitting
government they did not recognize, and how to replace the
existing opposition mechanisms inside and outside the country.
Exiles in Afghan History
The importance of exiles in the history of Afghanistan
derives largely from the difficulty of state formation in its
sparsely settled and largely barren territory. Especially after
much of the complex irrigation networks and urban settlements were destroyed by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth
century, Afghanistan was primarily a mountainous border land at the intersection of the imperial territories of Iran,
Turkic Central Asia, and India. State formation in Afghanistan
generally required access to the resources of these richer
areas.
The population was largely tribal. and the divisiveness of
tribal and clan feuds also made it difficult for a leader to emerge
over too large a segment of the society. Aspiring leaders often
made their careers through service to the neighboring empires.
where their highlanders' cavalry skills were much in demand. 1
Indeed, the founder of the Afghan monarchy in 1747,
Ahmad Shah Durrani. started his career in the Afghan horse of
the Persian emperor Nadir Shah. While his service outside the
borders of present-day Afghanistan - which did not exist as a
political unit at that time-was not exile. the use to which he put
his access to external resources illustrates one of the factors
accounting for the importance of exiles in Afghanistan's political
history. Ahmad Shah's seizure of much of Nadir Shah's treasury
after the latter's assassination did much to establish his power
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after his election as king at a tribalJirga (council) and set him on
his way to equipping an army. He then embarked on conquest
and raids of the territories of the declining Mughal emp ire . He
supported his rule mainly with resources derived from tructng the
rich agricultural areas of Punjab and Kashmir.•
As the Russian and British empires advanced toward
Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, they introduce d the
institutions of the modem state system. Both used exile and
support for exiles as political tools. The two greatest rule rs of
nineteenth century Afghanistan, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan
(reigned 1826-1839, 1843-1863) and Amir Abd-ur-Ra hman
Khan (reigned 1880-1901), ascended to the throne after peri ods
of exile. the former in British India. the latter in Russian Cen tral
Asia. 3
The First Anglo-Afghan War ( 1839-1842) began when the
British installed an Afghan exile, Shah Shuja, on the throne of
Kabul, forcing his rival, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, into exile
in India. After Shah Shuja was overthrown and the Bri tish
garrison massacred by the tribes during its retreat to Jalala bad ,
the British allowed Dost Mohammad Khan to return to Kabul an d
resume the throne.•
TheSecondAnglo-AfghanWar(l878-1880)likewiseen
ded
with the assumption of the throne by a former exile, Amir Abdur-Rahman Khan, who, despite, or perhaps because of, his
twelve-year exile in Russian-governed Samarkand and Tashke nt,
greatly distrusted the Russians and became a firm ally of Brit ain.
It was during his reign (1880-1901) that Afghanistan entere d the
modem state system as a demarcated nation-state with rec ognized domestic sovereignty. Amir Abd-ur-Rahman Khan , h owever, ceded control of his foreign relations to the British. In ret urn
for this concession. the British gave the Amir a yearly subsi dy in
cash and weapons which enabled him to crush the 40 rev olts
against his rule. 10 of which took on the magnitude of civil wars. 5
The Amir continued the practice. begun by the Britis h . of
using foreign exile as a tactic in dealing with political riva ls .•
While lesser opponents might expect any of a variety of sad istic
Central Asian punishments,' prominent sardars (tribal lea ders)
of the Moharnmadzai royal clan who had supported rival clai mants to the throne or otherwise opposed him were forced to live
abroad. Among the exiled sardars, who were subseque ntly
readmitted to Afghanistan by either Abd-ur-Rahrnan or his son
and successor. Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919), were two
families that subsequently played vital roles in Afghanist an's
politics: the Tarzis and the Musahiban.
The Tarzis lived in Damascus, then under Ottoman rule.
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and the Musahiban in British India. Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi,
a prominent poet. and his son, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, also traveled
to France and Egypt.a The Musahiban, including Nadir Khan
(who became king in 1929) and his four brothers, subsequently
spent most of the 1920s in a second exile in France. These exiles
were exposed to Western culture, politics, and technology, from
which Afghanistan was then quite isolated. Both the Tarzis and
the Musahiban played important roles in the introduction to
Afghanistan of the ideology of "modernization" which they had
imbibed during their years abroad.
Mahmud Beg Tarzi developed Islamic modernism in
Afghanistan and gathered around him an elite group known as
the "Young Afghans," after the Young Turks. His most influential
follower was his son-in-law. KingArnanullah Khan (1919-1928).
the son of Amir Habibullah Khan. who managed to seize the
throne when his father was assassinated in 1919. Tarzi initially
served Arnanullah as Foreign Minister. but resigned in 1925 in
disagreement with what he viewed as his son-in-law's overly
hasty imposition of the modernist ideas they shared on Afghanistan's tribal. Islamic society. A combination of tribal and fundamentalist revolts drove both Amanullah and Tarzi into exile in
1929. Tarzi died in Istanbul in 1933: Arnanullah died in Rome in
1960 .•
Besides his more important reforms. Arnanullah also
introduced diplomatic exile into the repertory of Afghan political
tactics. Arnanullah's declaration of complete independence for
Afghanistan, formalized in a treaty with Britain after the Third
Anglo-Afghan War (1919). enabled him to found Afghanistan's
diplomacy . When a rift developed between him and the Musahiban in 1924. he appointed Nadir Khan. who previously had
commanded his armed forces. as ambassador to France. Nadir
Khan soon resigned and lived on the Riviera until the overthrow
of Amanullah provided him and his brothers with an opportunity
to return to Afghanistan.
In January 1929 Kabul had fallen to a Tajik guerrilla
leader named Habibullah 10 who ruled as Amir of Afghanistan for
nine months with the support of some fundamentalist clergy and
ethnic minorities. Pash tun tribal forces led by Nadir Khan ousted
him the following October. Like all exiles from landlocked Afghanistan Nadir required at least the acquiescence of those who
controlled the surrounding territories. Nadir received somewhat
more than that from the British. They instructed their agents in
the border areas to allow not only his passage but that of tribal
forces from the Indian side of the frontier. who formed part of the
army Nadir led into Kabul. As previously in Afghanistan. the
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quasi-military social organization of the tribes obviated the
exiles' need for any dilTerentiated political organization. Nadir
Khan, like Abd-ur-Rahman Khan and Dost Mohammad Khan
before him, used his political skills and tribal kinship links to
step into the political void left at the top by the fissiparousness
of the segmentary lineage system among the tribes.
Upon his assassination in 1933 by a servant of the rival
Charkhl family, Nadir Shah (as Nadir Khan was known as king)
was succeeded by his son Mohammad Zahir Khan, who then
became known as Mohammad Zahir Shah. The nineteen-yearold boy was left to himself while his uncles ran the kingdom. In
1953 his cousin Daoud, 11 the Minister of Defense and former
military commander, took over as Prime Minister in a palace
coup. Daoud ruled for ten years, and that decade saw accelerated
attempts at "modernization," including the training and equipping of a modern army by the Soviet Union and the expansion of
the educational system with aid from several foreign countries,
including the U.S., France, Egypt, West Germany, and the USSR.
Daoud was forced to resign in 1963, and Zahir Shah inaugurated
ten years of attempted constitutional rule. During this period
there were two parliamentary elections, and the royal family was
not permitted to participate in politics.
In 1973 Daoud overthrew his cousin with the help of
leftist army and air force officers, including members of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (POPA), a pro-Soviet
Marxist-Leninist party that had been founded in 1965. This was
Afghanistan's first full-fledged military coup organized by professional officers. and it marked the entry onto the political stage of
the new intelligentsia produced by the expansion of education
and state employment since 1953. Daoud proclaimed Afghanistan a Republic with himself as President.
By this time, after ten years of relative freedom and forty
years without a serious challenge to the power of the ruling
dynasty, virtually all Afghan political exiles had returned home.
including the remains of King Amanullah, which had been
entombed with honors in Jalalabad. The 1973 coup. however.
once again created exiles whose struggles eventually came to
dominate Afghan politics.
Exiles from Daoud's Republic of Afghanistan
The first exile from Daoud's Republic was Zahir Shah
himself. Daoud staged his coup while Zahir was in Italy, and the
latter stayed there. He has lived in a modest villa outside of Rome
since that time. Until Daoud was overthrown and killed in 1978
by the same officers who had helped him to power in 1973, he
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sent a stipend to his deposed cousin. Thereafter Zahir Shah has
reportedly been supported by the Saudi royal family. His cousin
and son-in-law. Abdul Wall Khan, who had been commander of
the army's Central Forces. including the Kabul garrison, at the
tiine of the coup. was allowed by Daoud to Join him after being
imprisoned for two years. Today Zahir Shah remains one of
Afghanistan's most prominent political exiles. and Abdul Wali.
who acts as his gatekeeper. is suspected of wishing to be his
successor as well. From 1973 to 1978 a few other former ofIIcials
and dignitaries of the royal regime, virtually all of whom had
western educations, also emigrated to Europe and the United
states. where they acted more as immigrants than exiles.
From 1973 to 1983 Zahir Shah made no public statements about Afghanistan and behaved more like a retired king
than an active political exile. 11 Another group that fled Daoud,
however, immediately began planning their struggle. These were
the leaders of Afghanistan's nascent Islamist ("fundamentalist")
movement. who saw Daoud's republic as infiltrated by Communists and Soviet agents. Under the name of the Muslim Youth
(Jawanan-e Musulman). this movement had gained influence
among students at Kabul University, especially in the theology.
engineertng. and polytechnic faculties. Its members had demonstrated against the royal regime. which they considered unIslamic and overly influenced by the Soviet Union. Together with
their mentors from the Theology Faculty who led a more secret
group called Jamlat-e Islami-e Afghanistan (the Islamic Society
of Afghanistan). they fled to Pakistan in 1973 and 197 4 and took
up residence in the city of Peshawar. Among them were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Burhanuddin Rab bani. Ahmad Shah Massoud,
and Mawlawi Yunus Khales. 13
These exiles. who then had little support or organization
inside Afghanistan, set about the search for foreign shelter and
support. The Pakistani government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto agreed
to grant them asylum and military training. This was the
beginning of the powerful ties which continue to bind the
Islamists (and now all of the Pakistan-based muJahidin) to the
Pakistani directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi). the
agency that has dealt with them since that time. According to
Gen. Nasrullah Babur. Bhutto's governor of the Northwest
Frontier Province and key link man with the Afghan exiles. the
CIA also assisted in supporting them.••
Bhutto, a highly secularized populist leader, did not
support the Afghan Islamists out of ideological sympathy. Pakistan, however. had Just lived through the trauma of losing its
Eastern Wing when Indian military intervention completed what
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Bengali ethnic disaif ection and violent state repression had
begun . The predominantly Pashtun NWFP was also a site of
ethnic resentment against the Pakistani state. The latter had
inherited the conflict from the British, who had formalized the
separation of that area from Afghanistan as part of the settlement
of the Second Anglo-Afghan War.
The government of Afghanistan, and, with particular
fervor, Daoud, had never recognized the Durand Line between
the NWFP and Afghanistan as an international boundary. Afghanistan claimed that the Pashtun areas of Pakistan (which the
Afghan government called Pashtunistan) should have the option
of independence or union with Afghanistan. When Daoud took
power in 1973, he resumed his militancy on the Pashtunistan
question. which Zahir Shah had muted . Bhutto and Babur saw
in the Afghan Islamist exiles a force they could use to counter
Daoud's pressures and bring him to negotiate an end to the
dispute . At the same time, they foresaw that with the overthrow
of the Afghan monarchy by Soviet-trained army officers , Afghanistan might be entering a period of instability and external
intervention, and they wanted Pakistan to have some assets in
the coming struggle . Not only did they train and arm the
Islamists, they began a program of intensified road -building up
to the Afghan border, which today allows Pakistani military
trucks to supply the mujahidin .
The Afghan Islamists also sought aid from foreign sources
likely to be more sympathetic to them ideologically. In 1974
Burhanuddin Rabbani , a former lecturer at Kabul University's
Theology Faculty and the leader ("AmirM)of Jamiat-e Islami,
traveled from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia to seek support for the
Afghan Islamic cause. Rab bani, like many of the teachers on the
Theology Faculty, had been educated at Cairo'sAl -Azhar University, where he had come into contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, some of whose members (now political exiles from Egypt
themselves) worked for the Saudi-sponsored World Muslim
League (Rabitat al · 'Alam al -Islamf.._often known as Rabita)_. It is
unclear whether Rab bani succeeded in attracting any oflkial aid
at that time, but he may have begun the relationship which still
continues between the Afghan Islamists and pri vate Saudi
religious organizations and donors .
While Rab bani was in SaudiArabia, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
apparently began to organize his own followers separately.
Hekmatyar, a Pashtun, eventually led most of the Pashtun
Islamists into a separate organization , the Hezb -e Islami (Islamic
Party), while Rabbani, a Tajik , remained the leader of a now
predominantlyTajik.Jamiat . Massoud , who ls now Jamiat'smost
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famous commander, seems to have Joined Hezb initially, although he is a TaJik from PanJsher.
Besides the ethnic difference, which was never articulated in public, Helonatyar and Rabban1 split over strategy.
Hek.matyar agreed to the Pakistani proposal to set off an immediate insurrection, which Bhutto hoped would bring Daoud to
negotiate. (His goal was to exert pressure, not give the Isla.mists
the capability of winning any significant victories.) Rabbani
argued that such a move was premature, as more political work
needed to be done. In July 1975, some of the Islamlsts tried to
stage an uprising. which came to be known as the Panjsher
Valley incident. after the only area where it had any significant
1rnpact. Even in PanJsher, however, the insurgents were quickly
defeated. as the population did not respond to their calls. Those
who escaped capture (93 were arrested). including Massoud.
returned to Pakistan. where they continued to be maintained by
the ISi and perhaps the CIA.15
Exiles from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan I: POPA
Factional Exiles
The coup of April 27. 1978 (known to its supporters as the
"Saur Revolution." after the Persian zodiacal month of Saur. or
Taurus. in which it occurred) led to the establishment by decree
of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). This coup by
leftist army officers. who quickly turned over power to the
leadership of the PDPA. greatly enhanced the stature of the
existing Islamist exiles and created new groups of exiles. including less radical Sunni Islamic leaders. Shi ·a leaders who
generally fled to Iran. traditional nationalist leaders. a broad
spectrum of the intellectuals. and members of various defeated
factions of the POPA In addition, it began the flow of refugees
who today total over 5 million of Afghanistan's estimated population of about 15.5 million.
The PDPA was badly factionalized from its beginning; two
years after its founding it split into the PDPA-Khalq{masses). led
by Nur Mohammad Taraki. and the PDPA-Parcham (flag). led by
Babrak Karmal. Khalqis were mainly first-generation educated
tribal Pashtuns of rural origin. while Parchamls were ethnically
mixed urbanites. generally of higher social status and education.'" The Parchamls had supported Daoud's 1973 coup and
initially participated in his govenrment. Daoud soon removed
them from high positions. but they remained at lower levels,
including in the officer corps. The two factions reunited rather
tenuously under Soviet pressure in 1977 and carefully shared
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positions in the government that took over after the 1978 coup.
During the entire period of the party's existence as an
open secret (1965-1978. when there were no laws legalizing the
existence of political parties in Afghanistan). while some party
members and leaders were arrested. none were forced into exile .
Its leaders were well-known members of Kabul society, although
the extent of its membership. especially inside the armed forces
and the government bureaucracy, was a closely guarded secret.
Once the factional leaders had taken power and thus had access
to means of repression. they quickly made up for the relative
tolerance they had previously enjoyed by vigorously attacking
each other.
By July the Khalqis had removed all Parchamis from the
government and party leadership . While lesser Parchamis were
arrested. tortured. and even killed. the leading Parchamis were
sent into diplomatic exile, mostly to Warsaw Pact countries."
After plans for a Parchami coup were allegedly discovered in
August. these six were expelled from the party and ordered home,
but instead they disappeared for some time. most of them to
Moscow.
Little has been revealed of the activities of the Parchami
exiles in Moscow in 1978-1979. but it appears that they heavily
lobbied the leadership of the CPSU. mainly through the international department of the Central Committee. arguing that the
Khalqis. and especially their ultra-radical organization man,
Hafizullah Amin. were leading the Saur Revolution to disaster.
Babrak and his followers did not constitute themselves officially
as a government-in-exile, but they acted like one. They claimed
to their foreign sponsor, the USSR. that they were the rightful
leaders of Afghanistan and the POPA and urged Soviet action to
remove the usurper Amin. They wished, however, to avoid the
stigma of openly being installed by a foreign power. The first plan
they and the Soviets developed involved an anti-Amin alliance
between Babrak, still in Moscow, and Taraki. This ended with the
arrest and secret execution of Taraki in September 1979, after
which Amin openly assumed supreme power.
Finally, Babrak returned to Kabul at the end ofDecember
1979 after Soviet troops had deposed and killed Amin. While he
claimed to have been chosen as party leader in a secret meeting
inside Afghanistan. a meeting which supposedly also decided on
the overthrow and execution of Amin, Babrak's behavior was in
fact that of a classic leader of a government-in-exile. He broadcast an invitation to Soviet troops from Dushanbe, Soviet Tajikistan, and entered Kabul with his entourage three days later. 1• He
then established himself as General Secretary of the POPA and
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President of the Revolutionary Council, placing his Parchaimi
former fellow exiles in key positions. Najibullah, in particular .
became head of the reorganized secret police, now known as
l{hAD. the State Information Sexvices. the regime's most important and effective agency.
Some Khalqi leaders who were neither arrested nor killed
were subsequently sent into diplomatic exile. 1 • Khalq was now
divided into pro-Amin and pro-Tarakl factions. however. and the
leader of the pro-Tarakl faction. Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoi,
was named Minister of the Interior, in which post he commanded
his own security force and engaged at times in nearly open war
with Najibullah's KhAD.
Gulabzoi himself was sent into exile as ambassador to
Moscow in November 1988 as part of Najibullah's political
preparations for the Soviet troop withdrawal, which was completed on February 15. 1989. The preparations for that with drawal had begun in March 1986, when BabrakKarmal had been
informed in Moscow during the CPSU Congress that he would be
replaced as PDPA General Secretary by Najibullah. In November
he also lost his position as President of the Revolutionary
Council. and the next month Najibullah announced the plan for
wnaUonal reconciliation," a program for power sharing with the
resistance which Babrak had apparently resisted . These moves
precipitated a factional split in Parcham between pro-Babrak
and pro-Najibullah factions, and Babrak as well as some of his
closest collaborators were ultimately sent into exile in the USSR.
where Soviet dissidents reported sighting him in Moscow restau rants.
Other PDPA opponents of national reconciliation have
been sent into obscure diplomatic exile, such as Ismail Danesh.
who had to endure the insult ofbeing appointed second secretary
of the Afghan Embassy in Libya. Gulabzoi lost his post when
Najibullah and the Soviets had apparently agreed that. after the
Soviet withdrawal, the PDPA could no longer afford open factionalism .•0 He was reportedly taken from his house at night by Soviet
soldiers and escorted by them to the airport, where they put him
on a plane for Moscow. Before his exile, he had traveled at least
twice to Moscow to argue that he and the Khalqis would be better
suited to take over the government and stand on their own
against the mujahidin after the Soviet withdrawal. The author
knows of no indications that he has continued this campaign
since being appointed ambassador.
Exiles from the ORA II: Mujahldin and their Sponsors
Inside Afghanistan, the Khalqi policy of imposing revolu 71

tionary change by decree backed up by violent repression led to
revolts which were often unconnected to exile politics." Nonetheless, the cycle of revolt and repression both changed the status
of the existing exiles and brought many new groups of refugees,
some of whom became politically active. The local leaders of
relatively spontaneous army mutinies or village uprisings needed
weapons and political representation: the hundreds of thousands, then millions, of village refugees needed intermediaries
with the authorities of the host countries. These were needs the
exiles could meet. at the cost of striking deals with those who
supplied them.
The new exiles included members or sympathizers of the
Islamist groups who had remained in Afghanistan. Many of these
took up permanent residence in Pakistan or Iran, but others
returned to Afghanistan with weapons to lead the fronts ofJihad.
One small movement of this group back to Afghanistan included
a few of the veterans of the 1975 uprising. including Massoud
and his close associate, Mohammad Es'haq, who returned to
Panjsher in order to apply the political and military lessons they
had learned from their previous failures.
The Islamists hardly represented the totality of the religious establishment in Afghanistan. but the atheistic fervor of
the Khalqis spared no one. More traditional religious leaders who
had not challenged the legitimacy of the royal regime or of
President Daoud, whatever their misgivings about certain policies. soon fled for their lives and Joined their more radical
colleagues in exile. The Sunni leaders went to Pakistan and the
Shi 'a leaders, representing a minority sect in Afghanistan, to
Iran, especially Qom. Among the prominent Sunni leaders were
Sayed Ahmad Gallant, the leader of the Qadiri Sufi sect in
Afghanistan, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a prominent
religious scholar and former parliamentary deputy from Logar
province. They were Joined in Pakistan by a member of one of
what was, along with the Gallants, one of the two most prominent
religious families in Afghanistan, Hazrat Sibghatullah MoJaddedi. The Mojaddedis were the leaders of the main branch of the
Naqshbandi Sufi sect in Afghanistan and had traditionally
played important political roles; they proclaimed the Islamic legitimacy of the country's rulers and acted as mediators between
the court and the tribes in time of crisis. Most of the male
members of the family were killed by the Khalqi government in
February 1979, but Sibghatullah, who had remained in exile as
head of the Saudi-funded Islamic Center in Copenhagen, survived along with those members of the family who had Joined him
in Denmark .., These three leaders became the heads of the three
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parties of the Afghan resistance which variously cmne to be
1cnown as "moderate ," "traditionalist," or "nationalist ."
Besides these religious leaders, the waves of arrests and
killings of members of the educated elite who were suspected of
opposition to the PDPA drove increasing numbers of that class
into exile . Many of these intellectuals either had .a secular
orientation or were Islamic modernists in the tradition ofTarzi.
In Kabul they had opposed the Islamists, who protested the
moderate Westernizing policies of the Musahiban monarchy .
.Amongthem were surviving former ministers of the constitution alist period (many others of these ministers disappeared in the
Khalqi priSons). some of whom had at times tried to establish
political parties or clubs. generally with a nationalist or moderate
modernist complexion . They resented the prominence given by
the Pakistanis and other donors to the religious figures, espe cially the Islamists, and many of them subsequently emigrated
to Western countries .
Most numerous. however. were the uneducated peasants
and others who were victims of the government's (and later the
USSR's) policies of massive reprisals against civilians . For in stance, many of the inhabitants of Herat fled to Iran after the
uprising and ensuing battle in that city in February 1979 .23 Many
tribes of Paktia fled to Pakistan after a government offensive
there in September 1979 . Some tribes retroactively justified their
emigration on the grounds that now that Afghanistan was ruled
by kafers (unbelievers) it was their religious duty to undertake
hjjra (emigration) to an Islamic territory, on the model of Moham mad 's emigration from pre-Islamic Mecca to Medinah .

The Establishment of Exile Mujahldln Organizations
As these groups struggled to organize themselves on
foreign. mainly Pakistani, territory, to obtain the various types of
assistance they needed, and to build or consolidate links with the
internal resiStance. ideologies and foreign patronage interacted
with factional. personal. and ethnic loyalties. After the direct
Soviet military intervention of December 1979, the resistance
and refugee organizations began to assume the forms they have
retained to this day. The Soviet intervention both accelerated the
flow of refugees of all types (including thousands of surviving
prisoners who had been released in an early attempt by the
regime to distance itself from the former government's repressions) and intensified the interest of foreign powers in the
conflict .
Each leader (or would-be leader) tried to construct his
own network. using his links to various groups and whatever
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resources he could extract from various patrons. One pec uliar
route to the formation of an organization was taken by thr ee of
the leaders who were eventually recognized by Pakistan: they
were chosen as compromise candidates for the leadershi p of a
coalition. largely because they had no organization of their own
to threaten the coalition's members, and used this positi on to
tum the coalition into a separate organization with themse lves
as the leader .••
It was ultimately the Afghan cell of the Pakistan mi litary
government, consisting of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (then Chief Ma rtial
Law Administrator) and some generals close to him as well as the
leadership of the ISi. who decided which Afghan political forc es
would be recognized. They decided from the beginning that
explicitly pro-royalist or tribal forces, associated with the Pas h tunistan demand, would play no role. They did not want to
channel weapons and other aid through Afghan nationalists who
might appeal to Pakistani Pashtun dissidents. Instead th ey
preferred parties with an explicitly religious orientation. and
among those, the parties closest to the ISi and the Pakist ani
Islamist organization, the Jama'at-e Islami, the only party in
Pakistan to offer qualified support to the military regime. (In this
respect, the choice was also dictated by the quest for domes tic
and international legitimacy of the then isolated regime of Gen .
Zia).
Initially. in 1980-81. they settled on six parties. Th ree
were derived from the old Islamist exiles. the Hezb ofGulbuddi n,
a breakaway faction also called Hezb-e Islam! led by Mawlawi
Yunus Khales. and Rabbani's Jamtat. Three more parties rep resented more traditional forms of Islam, Mojaddedi's Natio nal
Liberation Front. Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afgha ni stan. and Mohammadi's Islamic Revolutionary Movement of
Afghanistan.
A seventh party was subsequently recognized after the
parties formed a brief coalition called the Islamic Union for the
Liberation of Afghanistan. As head of this alliance. from whi ch
the three traditionalist parties soon withdrew. the parties agree d
upon Abd-ur-Rabb-ur-Rasul
Sayyaf, a former lecturer from
Kabul University's Theology Faculty .•, Sayyafs main qualifi cation was that he spoke excellent Arabic and sometimes (depend ing on his audience) professed to follow the Wahhabi sect ofis lam
favored by the Saudi monarchy . He was therefore a formi d able
fundraiser in the Gulf . He used his talents. however. to buil d up
his own organization. despite the near universal hostility of
Afghans to Wahhabism . His party, of course, is the Islamic Uni on
for the Liberation of Afghanistan .
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The ISI consistently favored the Islamists over the tradiuonalists and the Hezb ofHekmatyar over the other Islamists. for
a combination of reasons: the fonner had longstanding ties to the
!SI and were deemed to be more controllable: the Islamists and
especially Hezb were supposedly more effective and better disciplined: and the Jama 'at-e Islam! politically favored those parties
on ideological grounds, while the military felt more confident that
they would not raise the nationalist Pashtunistan issue. Sayyaf
has further enjoyed immense Arab financial backing, which has
enabled him, alone of all the parties, to pay wages to his
mujahidin. The Saudi Red Crescent also paid the entire costs of
transporting heavy weapons into Afghanistan for the Islamist
parties. but only a portion (given by one source as 15 percent) for
the traditionalist parties. •a
Until 1985 there were two alliances: one of the Islamists.
which existed only on paper. and one of the traditionalists. which
actually had a joint office in Peshawar and even promoted some
joint organizations inside Afghanistan. especially in the deeply
traditional tribal areas along the Pakistan border. By May 1985,
however, the Pakistani and American sponsors of these organizations had decided that in order to increase the diplomatic and
political pressure on the Soviet Union it was necessary for the
mujahidin to form a single alliance capable of representing them
abroad. They finally succeeded in pressuring the seven groups to
form a coalition called the Islamic Union ofMujahidin of Afghanistan. The existing moderate alliance office was closed, and each
of the seven parties · retained its pre-existing structure. The
leaders of the seven parties rotated three-month terms as
spokesman . Decisions were taken by consensus, which is to say
they were often not taken, unless the ISi representative who
always attended the meeting absolutely insisted.
The ISi and CIA never tried to make this coalition take
over the most important function - transferring weapons into
Afghanistan - from the parties. The Slate Department and
USAID. however, attempted to tum it into a more genuine
organization by channelling their cross-border humanitarian
assistance through committees of the Alliance. This met only
limited success.
Inside Afghanistan the alliance had little formal presence. The mujahidin were affiliated with the parties, and in some
areas they developed means of cooperation either across broader
regions or among the parties, but these locally based structures
were not usually connected to the alliance of the exiled leaders. 28
The allegiance of the commanders to the exiled leaders ranged
from the purely opportunistic (those who Joined a party solely to
07
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obtain weapons) to the committed (pre-war activists of t he
Islarnist movement who continued their organizational invo lvement in a new form). Except for some in the border region who
were in fact based in Pakistan, the mujahidin did not recei ve
instructions from Peshawar : their relations with the party he ad quarters were characterized more by negotiation and expedienc y
than hierarchical control.

The Geneva Accords and the "Second Track"
For most of the war. the Pakistan and the U.S. governments regarded their support for the exile- led Afghan parti es
mainly as a way to increase the military and political costs of the
Soviet intervention . Since they did not believe that the Soviets
would withdraw. they were not very concerned with the capacit y
of the resistance organizations to organize a political alternativ e
to the Kabul government.
This perspective changed by the end of 1987. when it wa s
becoming clear that Gorbachev in fact intended to withdra w
Soviet troops from Afghanistan through the U.N.-sponsor ed
Geneva negotiations. Previously the U.S., Pakistan. and the
parties they supported had not participated in various efforts to
propose political changes in Kabul. The first public attempt to
build a new legitimate government was made by Zahir Shah . In
mid-1983, when it seemed that Soviet leader Yuri Androp ov
might successfully negotiate a Soviet pullout. Zahir Shah issue d
his first public declaration in ten years. At that time there was n o
functioning alliance of mujahidin, and Zahir Shah called on
Afghans to unite to form a body that could represent them.•• He
made it clear that. if he were asked. he would be willing to hea d
such a body in his personal capacity. 3 0 Some of his forme r
ministers and diplomats, tribal leaders. and some supporters of
the moderate resistance parties developed plans to hold a Loy a
Jirga ..the traditional tribal assembly. with the ex-king presidin g,
and they had pressured him into finally taking a public stan d.
The Islamists. however, denounced these efforts as an attempt to
restore the corrupt monarchy. and Pakistan ref used to allow the
Jirga to take place on Pakistani territory. In any case . as
Andropov fell ill and the U.S . and Pakistan hardened the ir
positions. the Geneva negotiations were stalemated .
The next proposal came from Moscow after the election of
Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU. In a maj or
speech on Soviet Asian policy delivered on July 28. 198 6.
Gorbachev called for the formation of an Afghan governme nt
"with the participation in it of those political forces which foun d
themselves outside the country" - a reference to exiled resis76

tance leaders. refugees. and the former king. On December 30.
l986. after returning from a trip to Moscow accompanied by the
entire Kabul leadership. Najibullah announced details of a
proposal for Mnational reconciliation. "31
In theory. the national reconciliation program envisaged
a coalition government composed of all political elements. including the exiled resistance parties. For the first time. the
Afghan Communists recognized the legitimacy of other organized
political currents and offered them representation. In an attempt
to split the internal resistance from the exiled leaders. Najibullah
publicly appealed to major resistance commanders (some of
whom his government had previously sentenced to death in
absentia) to join the government.
There was little movement toward a new government
until Gorbachev's speech February 8. 1988. which met
Washington's demand for a short timetable and a Mdatecertain"
for withdrawal. and also countered a new position taken by
Pakistan. or at least by President Zia. When he realized that the
Soviets were about to meet the Americans· demands for a
umetable, Zia seemingly reversed his position and stated that he
did not want Pakistan to sign the agreement without the formation of an interim government.3 2 Under strong Pakistani pressure
and despite continuing sharp differences over the form of a
future government of Afghanistan. the alliance announced on
February 25 that it had agreed on a formula for an interim
government, but it could not agree on even a partial cabinet until
June 19. Indeed. according to diplomatic sources. the members
of the alliance were utterly unable to reach agreement. and the
final list of cabinet members was drawn up by an extremely
frustrated Gen. Hamid Gul. director of the ISi. after he ref used
to let the seven leaders finish another meeting without reaching
agreement.
The proposed government disappointed those who had
hoped it would serve as a starting point for serious negotiations.
It consisted almost solely of officials of the Peshawar parties and
was dominated by radical Islamists. The head of the government.
once again in deference to Saudi financial power. was Eng.
Ahmad Shah. a member of Sayyafs Wahhabi party. The Mgovemment" contained no resistance commanders from inside Afghanistan. no representative of the Shi 'a resistance parlieS, 33
and no important independent intellectuals or technocrats.
Predictably. the proposal met with a cold reception from the
Afghan refugees and resistance commanders. 3 • Furthermore.
none of the resistance's sponsors extended recognition to the
proposed Mgovemment."
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rnent in Kabul as well as the USSR, but in fact he met the demand
of the mujahidin by not including any Afghan government
representative in his delegation. This permitted them to sustain
the belief in the illegitimacy of the Soviet-sponsored Afghan
regime.
Vorontsov, however, did not agree to recognize the Peshawar alliance as the sole representative of exiled Afghan political
forces . He also traveled to Teheran, where he met with the eight
Shi'a parties recognized by Iran. and to Rome, where he met
Zahir Shah. The Peshawar alliance denounced these meetings as
an attempt to create division.
According to Vorontsov. out of these discussions a rough
consensus emerged on a method for forming an interim govemrnent for Afghanistan . Instead of the Loya Jirga, a tribal -based
national tradition which the Islamists rejected, the discussions
centered on the Islamic concept of a shura. which had originally
been proposed by Pakistan . This shura, of several hundred
persons. would include representatives of the Peshawar and
Iranian exiles. the ex-king, and delegates from Kabul. The main
sticking point in the negotiations with the Soviets was over the
nature of representation from Kabul. Vorontsov (and later,
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze himself) insisted that these
delegates would represent the POPA, which the mujahidin
rejected . The mujahidin broke off the talks over this issue in
January.
The Afghan Shura of February 1989: An Interim Government
of Exiles
Despite the breakdown of negotiations with the Soviets,
the Alliance proceeded to constitute its own shura. The seven
parties proposed that each of the leaders would nominate 60 representatives to the shura, supposedly to be distributed among
party workers, resistance commanders, refugees, and prominent exiles . This formula guaranteed that the Islamists would
outnumber the traditionalists. The parties also agreed that 19
"good Muslims" from Kabul could attend, but these delegates
were never named, and their seats remained empty. Participation by the ex-king having been rejected, the main remaining
issue regarding the composition of the shura was the number of
seats to be allotted to the Shi'a parties based in Iran.
This conflict was connected to the principal issue that
initially faced the shura : what exactly it was supposed to do. The
shura was convened without either an agenda or rules of
procedure. ISi officers attended all meetings and gave many
delegates the impression of being in control. The ISi, the Saudis,
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After the signing of the agreement, on April 14, 1988, all
the four state parties to the accords granted the U.N.·s ne gotiator
Diego Cordovez, a mandate to assist Afghans in the formation of
a broad-based government. He eventually developed a proposal
for the formation of a "National Government of Peace and
Reconstruction." He suggested two stages: a "cooling off' period
and a Loya Jirga. In the first. "leaders of all existing political
parties would agree to postpone their active strugg le as a
patriotic sacrifice." During that period "A National Government
for Peace and Reconstruction, consisting of Afghans of recognized independence and impartiality. (would) take office in
Kabul. ... "35 The new Government would then prepare for the
convening of a Loya Jirga under rules acceptable to all parties.
The Soviets and the POPA never formally reject ed the
proposal. Mojaddedi and Gailani made supportive state ments.
as did a number of prominent Pash tun resistance comma nders.
The Islamist resistance leaders. however, rejected it, as did
President Zia. American diplomats also disparaged it in press
leaks. Mujahidin leaders sent several letters to U.N. Secretary
General (S.G.) Perez de Cuellar complaining about Cord ovez. In
November, the S.G. concluded that Cordovez, who had b ecome
Foreign Minister of Ecuador in August. while retaining his role as
the S.G.'s representative on Afghanistan. could no longer serve
as an intermediary, and he removed the broad-based government from his brief. Although Perez de Cuellar had stated th at he
would take personal charge of the effort. in fact he left it to a
middle-level U.N. official based in Pakistan. 3 •
Into this breach stepped Yuli Vorontsov, who, be sides
being the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, had just been appointed ambassador to Kabul. His main task, apparently, was to
oversee the final ex.it of Soviet troops and, if possible, the
construction of a broad-based government acceptable to Moscow.
After the announcement of the "suspension" of the Soviet troop
withdrawal on November 15, Vorontsov proposed direct talks
with exiled Afghan leaders. Such direct talks had been the main
political demand the resistance leaders had made all along, and
their absence had been their main objection to the diplom atic
process thus far.
Such talks had first been proposed by the Soviets in J uly,
ostensibly to discuss Soviet prisoners of war held by the muj ahi din.
After a first round of low-level talks in Islamabad. Moscow
proposed discussions between Vorontsov and the leaders of the
alliance in Saudi Arabia . The first such talks were held in Taif on
December 3-4, 1988. and later continued in Islamabad. Vorontsov claimed that he was negotiating on behalf of the govem78

and the Islamist leaders wanted the function of the shura_to be
limited to approving the "interim government"
chosen the
previous year. Hence they wanted to be sure of a majority in favor,
which they would have without the Shi'a, given the four to three
distribution derived from the structure of the alliance. However
even though the Shi'a parties recognized by Iran were als~
Islamist, they would be sure to oppose any government headed
by a Wahhabi such as Ahmad Shah (the Wahhabis are among the
most anti-Shi 'a of all Sunni Muslims, and Saudi Arabia, the
main patron of the Wahhabis, is the major opponent of Khomeini's
Iran within the Islamic world.) Hence the moderates had at least
a short-term common interest with the Shi 'a in allotting the
latter enough seats to def eat the government of Eng. Ahmad
Shah. The Sunni Islamists, on the other hand, wished to keep the
number of Shi 'a delegates small. 37
Furthermore. one of Saudi Arabia's main foreign policy
goals ls to contain the influence of the Iranian revolution within
the Islamic world, and Saudi representatives ultimately weighed
in heavily against strong representation for the Shi 'a. Iran, on
the other hand, saw in the shura a way to assert its influence in
Afghanistan, a task which for ten years had been eclipsed by the
recently concluded war with Iraq.
The Sunni and Shi 'a alliances had had virtually no
contact throughout the war, but Vorontsov's meeting with both
had forced them to consult with each other. The negotiation
process was complex and drawn out, including trips to Pakistan
by the Shi 'a leaders as well as Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati and trips to Iran first by Rabbani and Mojaddedi in
January and then by Mojaddedi (who was then alliance spokesman) in February. During this visit Mojaddedi and the Qom
alliance reached agreement on representation of 120 delegates
(the equivalent of two parties). which would have given the antiWahhabi forces a 5 to 4 advantage.
On his return to Pakistan, the Islamist leaders charged
Mojaddedi with acting without authorization and refused to
accept the agreement. The Saudis also weighed in with their
influence and money. According to U.S. diplomats in Riyadh, the
Saudi intelligence service spent $26 million per week during the
shura. Other sources mention that each delegate received at least
$25,000.3 8 One of the results of these expenditures was that,
finally, none of the Shi'a parties supported by Iran participated
in the shura. a result which seemed to satisfy the Saudis. The
U.S. might not have been displeased with this outcome either.
but it maintained a low public profile.
Hence, when the shurafinally convened in Rawalpindi on

80

February 10, 1989, it was clearly not a broad-based body but one
chosen by the leaders of the seven Sunni parties, who acted as
a collective presidium. Mohammad! chaired the meeting, and
sayyaf acted as spokesman. 3 •The ISI and the Pakistani Foreign
Ministry had prevailed on the parties to each nominate five
members from Afghan exiles outside of Pakistan (from Europe.
,America. or the Middle East). but most of those so named were
merely foreign representatives of the parties. There were eight or
nme such delegates who considered themselves genuinely independent and met as a caucus.
The Pakistanis and Saudis exercised their influence and
control in different ways, but obviously enough that many
Afghans ultimately rejected the outcome. First. even the process
of nomination of delegates by the party leaders was not considered adequate to ensure control; there was also a screening
committee. the origin of which remains obscure. which had to
approve each delegate as a "good Muslim ." According to members
of moderate-traditionalist parties. this committee met in a Pakistani army barracks, and ISI officers participated in its deliberations. It rejected the credentials of Humayun Assefy, a former
diplomat and a relative of Zahir Shah. • Events surrounding the
shura_also made it clear that pro-Zahir Shah forces would not be
permitted to participate. Two days before the opening of the
shura about fifty men shouting slogans in favor of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar violently broke up a Peshawar rally of several thousand people in favor of Zahir Shah as Pakistani police looked on.
Second. the ISI was in charge of all the security arrangements. and its officers openly attended all meetings. giving
several delegates the impression that they were in charge. They
also summoned various delegates for consultations from time to
time. Furthermore. most of the delegates stayed in the Ha.1Jcamp
in Rawalpindi. a large complex which was closed to journalists
and other outsiders. The only foreigners permitted to enter
during the entire period were ISi officers and a certain number
of Arabs, presumably Saudis.
As noted above, the Islamists intended that the only
function of the shura would be to approve the government of Eng .
Ahmad Shah . Some delegates objected that the shura was only
consultative - it had been appointed by seven persons. not
elected by the nation - and hence did not have the authority to
choose a government. On the third day of sessions, when Sayyaf
announced that the meeting would now approve that government, as one delegate described it, "a storm broke out among the
participants." While many people were shouting various things.
one of the most common themes was that there should not be any
0
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Wahhabis in the government. The chair lost control. and the
meeting was suspended .
The Pakistanis and Saudis reasserted control by the end
two weeks later, but at the cost of making their influence much
more obvious. First the ISi convened a meeting of the seven
leaders. The leaders then agreed to appoint a committee of 70 to
make a proposal to the shura; this committee was then reduced
to a group of 14. two from each party . The group of 14 was spirited
away in the custody of the ISi and met in secret.
It returned with a proposal for sharing cabinet positions
among the seven leaders and their parties according to the
results of an election. Each member of the shura was to vote for
two of the seven party leaders. The leader with the highest
number of votes would be president, who would act as spokesman and represent the government abroad. The second highest
votegetter would be prime minister. who would actually be in
charge of running the government. Other major ministries were
to be apportioned among the remaining five leaders.• 1
According to delegates to the shura , rather than leave this
process to the Afghans. the ISi and the Saudis tried to manipulate the vote through various forms of pressure, including bribes.
to assure that the outcome would be to their liking . It is not clear
whether the election of Mojaddedi as the president coincided
with their wishes. but at least the Pakistani Foreign Ministry was
not displeased . Mojaddedi projected a moderate image which
might appeal to both the West and Afghans in Kabul; he spoke
good French. English. and Arabic, and also had a relatively good
relationship with the Shi 'a groups. who would eventually have
lo be brought in . He received 174 votes. the highest number.
Mohammad! had apparently been led to believe that his being
chosen as chair of the shura_would presage his being selected for
head of state. and he was somewhat frustrated at this outcome.
which led to some further disruption (see below).
The Saudis may have wanted their candidate, Sayyaf, to
be the president , but they were satisfied with his election as
prime minister with 173 votes . This outcome contrasted strongly
with the violent anti -Wahhabi reaction earlier , and at least some
participants attribute the difference to Saudi money. Mohammad!, a well -known Jurist, came in third as head of the supreme
court. The ISi may have wanted Gulbuddin Helanalyar to finish
higher than he did , but he came in fourth and was named defense
minister. Khales received the positions of state security and
internal affairs,•• Rabbani the foreign ministry. and Gailani, the
moderate considered closest to Zahir Shah. the ministries of
reconstruction and education. •3
82

Mohammad!, however, disrupted the outcome by using a
procedural rule that the committee of 14 had proposed. According to this rule, any leader could take any post lower on the list
than the one he had won. and Mohammad! asked for the Defense
Ministry. This infuriated Gulbuddin. There were two days of
negotiations, and the dispute was finally settled in the office of
Gen. Hamid Gul. Gulbuddin got Rabbani's place as foreign
minister, Gailani became head of the supreme court, and Rabbani received the ministries of reconstruction and education.
Rab bani reportedly felt that he and his Tajik constituency had
been squeezed out of power by the Pash tuns, with the support of
Pakistan.

In guest of Recognition
The proposed "government" did not directly control any
personnel, population, or territory. The war was still being waged
by mujahidin more or less affiliated to the seven parties and who
had no links to the interim government except through those
parties. While some in Washington advocated distributing weapons through the new "Minister of Defense," the "ministry" in fact
had no such capability, and the seven parties alone continued to
transfer and distribute external aid.
The credibility of the interim government depended on its
ability to demonstrate control of territory and population inside
Afghanistan and to obtain international recognition. On both
scores, its performance in the first months of its existence fell far
short of its sponsors' expectations or at least hopes.
Since the mujahidin claimed to control the vast majority
of territory of Afghanistan, the interim government claimed not
to be a government-in-exile. It proclaimed its intention to move
inside Afghanistan and hold elections within six months. It
sought to hold its first meeting on Afghan territory ... The meeting, however, was more a media event than an actual cabinet
meeting . Rabbani and Gailani did not attend, and little if any
business was conducted.
The interim government and its supporters, especially
the ISI, hoped that, soon after the completion of the Soviet
withdrawal, it would be able to move inside Afghanistan more
permanently in the wake of major military victories. In particular. the alliance seemed to hope that it would be able to move to
Jalalabad . The alliance, however, has no joint military staff
capable of strategic planning on a nation-wide basis, nor does it
have the command and control capabilities necessary to coordinate a national offensive to seize the government's strategic
points. Such shortcomings had not been serious obstacles to
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fighting a guerrilla resistance. but they had to be overcome in
order to win a conventional battle for cities and garrisons. Rather
than wait for the resistance to develop such capabilities - a
somewhat dubious prospect in any event. at least among the
feuding commanders of the border tribal zones - the ISi stepped
in and made plans for an offensive.
In early February. the author was told by commanders in
the Jalalabad area that the ISi was already establishing a plan
for an assault. despite the misgivings of many of the commanders in the area. The ISi similarly summoned commanders in the
Qandahar area to a meeting and offered them money and
weapons if they would agree to attack the garrison and the
government-held parts of the city. In Qandahar, where the
traditional tribal forces are still strong and are in communication
with the government garrison. the mujahidin refused. Around
Jalalabad. however. where the Islamists are stronger. the tribal
organization is weaker, and Peshawar is much closer, the
commanders eventually agreed. It appears that the timing of the
assault was meant to coincide with the mid-March meeting of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference in Riyardh. Saudi Arabia .
The plan apparently was to move the interim government into
Jalalabad and request recognition from the OIC.
In the event. while the offensive did capture some fortified
targets and disabled part of the airport, it failed to take J alalabad
city. The interim government nonetheless won recognition from
Saudi Arabia (and hence Bahrain). Furthermore. the interim
government's foreign minister. Gulbuddin Hedmatyar. attended
the OIC meeting and was granted Afghanistan's seat. which had
been left empty since the Soviet intervention. The OIC. of course,
was largely influenced by the Saudi decision. which reflected the
Saudi approval of the composition of the interim government,
and especially its exclusion of the Iranian-sponsored groups.
Soon after the OIC meeting the interim government was also
recognized by Sudan and Malaysia. 0
Neither Pakistan nor the United States. interestingly
enough, recognized the interim government. although there were
internal debates in both countries on what approach to take.
Despite their active role in supporting the mujahidin and their
denunciation of the government in Kabul as illegitimate, neither
country had broken diplomatic relations with the latter. Although neither country had sent an ambassador to Kabul since
1979, both retained a diplomatic mission there until 1989. and
neither has closed the Afghan government's missions in their
own country. There is even an Afghan consulate in the University
Town area of Peshawar. just around the comer from the head84

quarters of the alliance.
In the U.S .. Congressional forces led by Sen. Gordon
Humphrey (Republican - New Hampshire) have long advocated
that Washington break relations with Kabul and recognize the
mujahidin. The State Department has countered that it did not
conduct political business with Kabul. but that it was in the
interest of the United States to keep a mission there to collect
intelligence. Furthermore. the State Department argued. the
alliance. and now the interim government. does not have the
minJIDal criteria required by U.S. policy for recognition. namely
effective administrative control of territory and population and
the ability to carry out the international obligations of Afghanistan.
Since the establishment of the interim government.
Humphrey and others have argued that. even if the U.S . does not
(yet) recognize it as a government, it should at least send an
ambassadoJial level appointee to conduct relations with it. The
U.S. embassy in Islamabad had for several years included a
"special envoy" responsible for relations with the resistance, but
this official reported through the Ambassador to Pakistan. Supporters of direct dealings with the interim government hope that
such a relationship will enable the U.S . to pursue a more
independent policy, rather than simply support Pakistan's.••
In Pakistan the debate over recognition of the interim
government coincides to some extent with the major political
cleavage. that between the Bhutto government and the support ers of the late President Zia and his "Islamization" policies.
Several of the Islamic parties in Pakistan have called for recognition of the mujahidin government. The Pakistani government
has argued that it cannot recognize the interim government
because of its obligation under the Geneva accords not to
interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but this does not
seem very convincing in view of the government's flouting of other
provisions of the same accords, notably by assisting and influencing the organization of the shura as well as by continuing to
supply the mujahidin. The government's position may reflect a
split between the Bhutto government and its foreign ministry on
the one hand and. on the other, the military and intelligence
agencies that have mainly controlled Afghan policy. Following
the removal of Gen. Gul as ISI director in June 1989 (which was
mainly dictated by domestic Pakistani politics) the foreign ministry and prime minister's ofTicemay play a larger role.
These disputes might have become moot had Jalalabad
and other cities fallen . but no major centers have been taken over
by mujahidin since the final withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Several
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provincial capitals had fallen to them at the beginning of the
withdrawal. including those of Bamlyan. Takhar, and Kunar .)
There are several reasons for this. Militarily, the mujahidi n . as
noted, do not have the command and control needed to mount
major conventional attacks. nor do they have the heavy wea pons
needed to attack fortified concrete bunkers, although their
rockets can destroy (and have destroyed) civilian homes and
civilian government buildings.
Many analysts. however. including this one, thoug h t that
such military capabilities would not be necessary. because of the
political weakness of the Kabul government. which had func tioned for years as the umbrella for the Soviet forces. The
mujahidin and their supporters anticipated mass defectio ns
leading to a crumbling of the regime from within. Instea d . the
regime's soldiers and militia have generally fought with cons iderable determination , more, in fact than they seem to have sho wn
while Soviet troops were fighting alongside them .
The main reason seems to lie in the political weakness of
the mujahidin themselves. Their lack of unity and the lac k of
credibility of the interim government they have proposed hav e
prevented the latter from posing a serious alternative to the
Kabul regime as a defender of Afghanistan's national interes ts .
The government has publicized the involvement of Pakistani and
Arab forces with the mujahidin and has sought to portray the m
as foreign agents. While some specific charges are exaggera ted
(such as the charge that Pakistani soldiers are actually fighting
inside Afghanistan, although intelligence agents are doubtle ss
present). the overall picture of the exiled leaders' dependence on
_foreign support is not inaccurate. At the same time Najibulla h
has intensified initiatives aimed at attracting support of or at
least neutralizing the internal commanders . He evinces sympa thy for the sufferings they have undergone, compared with the
comforts of foreign supported exile. and has offered to supp ly
them with all the resources they need for their areas .
The behavior of the mujahidin and of some of the Ara b
(mainly Wahhabi) volunteers who accompany them has als o
helped convince many of those on the government side to fight
on . In one well-publicized case in November 1988, mujahidin
from Hezb -e Islaml (Khales) massacred over 70 members of a
government garrison which had defectecL Despite condemnatio n
of this action by the resistance leaders, such actions have been
repeated, including during the course of the battle for J alalaba d .
Furthermore. in many areas taken over by mujahidin
after the withdrawal of Soviet troops there was, at least initially,
a breakdown of civil order, followed by looting. arbitrary killings
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of people associated with the government, and rapes and killings
of unveiled women or women who were members of the family of
real or supposed government supporters. Such incidents occurred in Kunduz (which was subsequently recaptured by the
government), Asadabad (capital ofKunar). Taleghan (capital of
Takhar). and elsewhere.
In some cases these abuses resulted from indiscipline.
but in others they were Justified on principle. The Wahhabis, and
particularly the Arab volunteers who increasingly accompany
them . argue that areas of Afghanistan controlled by the Commu rust government constitute non-Muslim territory. and that their
inhabitants. who have refused the call oflslam , may be subjected
to the laws of futuhat, or conquest. According to these laws.
which originated in Arab tribal customs of the time of Moham mad . the men of such a territory may be executed, their women
and children enslaved. and their property confiscated as booty.
News of these atrocities has spread. and the government
has naturally helped to dilluse them. The inhabitants of the
government -controlled areas, whatever their political or reli gious views, fear that a victory of the mujahidin could mean
death or dishonor for them. Hence there are reports that many
1n Kabul feel trapped or that the current government, even if they
hate it. may be better than the currently available alternative.
This is especially true of women. but it applies to some extent to
the entire educated middle class. The PDPA is thus increasingly
able to cast itself as the only capable defender of the Afghan
nationalist and modernist tradition stretching back to Tarzi.
Many Afghans and others argue that ultimately the fate
of the country will be determined by the commanders. such as
Massoud , who have actual power bases inside the country,
rather than by either the exiled leaders or the PDPA. The com manders. however. still face the problem which leaders of
indigenous revolts faced in Afghanistan's past: all of them lead
a more or less narrow segment of the society, and none of them
can bring the others together. Nor can any of them mobilize the
resources on his own to form a dominant army. This is why exiles
with foreign assistance have so often been able to step in and
rule, from Dost Mohammad to Nadir Shah . The rulers who took
power after the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars were not
themselves the leaders of the anti-British struggles, but exiles
who managed to form alliances with feuding tribal military
forces .
At that time, however. the tribal system was the basis of
military and political power in the region. Today the tribal system
has decayed (unevenly, and to different extents in different
47
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regions), and the technology of modem warfare has both accelerated the decline of the traditional society and replaced it with
a different form of organization of armed men: guerrillas fun ded
by ideologically motivated political organizations. To unite these
groupings and manage the military activity of contem po rary
warfare requires more elaborate forms ofleadership and organization. Th us far neither the exile leaders of the Afghan muj ahi din
nor the former king have shown their capabilities in these areas
to be the equal to the devotion and bravery of the fighters at the
front. Whether any of these exiles will be able to master these
skills as e1Iectively as the mujahidin learned to use Stin ger
missiles remains to be seen.
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•Hasan Kakar. Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political
Development.. 1880-1901 (Lahore: Panjab University Press, 1971).
•While it is outside the scope of this study, it is inte resting to note that the Amir also used domestic exile extensive ly as
a means of collective punishment for Pash tun tribes who revo lted
against him. (This contrasted with his less favorable treatme nt
of the Shi 'a Hazaras. who were dispossessed of their land and
sold into slavery.) The Amir forcibly moved a number of suc h
tribes away from their homelands (watan) to other areas, mainl y
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non-Pashtun ones, where they were simultaneously deprived of
their traditional base of power and available for his use as allies
against the indigenous non-Pashtun
populations. On these
relocations see Nancy Tapper, "Abd al-Rahman 's North-West
Frontier: The Pash tun Colonisation of Afghan Turkistan," in
Richard Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and
Afghanistan (London : Croom Helm, 1983).
1 See Hasan
Kakar, Government and Society in Afghani stan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1979) on the Amir's prisons.
aDupree, Afghanistan, p. 438.
9The most thorough study of Amanullah's reign is Leon
Poull ada , Ref onn and Rebellion in Afghanistan.
1919 -1929
(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1973).
• 0Amir Habibullah
was commonly known, especially to
his opponents, as Bacha-e Saqao. son of the water carrier.
1 •The French
exile background of the Musahiban dynasty
explains the conventional French spelling of the name - Daoud,
rather than Daud or Dawud .
11 See below on Zahir Shah's
"activities" (if that is the right
word) since 1983.
13 Dr.
Tawana.
"Memoirs of Islamic Movement,"
AFGHANews (May 1989).
••New York Times..,April 30, 1989 .
" For an account by a participant see Mohammad Es'haq
"Memoirs of Islamic Movement," AFGHANews (March 1989).
••For more extensive discussions of factionalJsm in the
POPA see Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two -Party Commu nism: Fareham and Khalq (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983);
Ollvier Roy, "Le Double Code Afghan: Marxisme et Tribalisme,"
Revue Francaise de Science Politique (December 1986). pp. 846 861 ; and Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First -hand
Account (Khalid Hasan, tr.) (London: Verso, 1988).
1
7These included Babrak Karmal, his step -brother
Mahmud Baryalai, his reported mistress, Anahita Ratebzad,
Nur Ahmad Nur, Baryalai's long-time associate Abdul Wakil, and
Babrak 's successor, Najibullah (then known only as Najib).
18
A Soviet scholar of Afghanistan speaking in the U.S.
stated that Western scholars were wrong when they claimed that
Babrak gave the speech from Tashkent; "it was Dushanbe ," he
stated.
••Mohammad Sarwari, for instance, was sent as ambassador to Mongolia, where he still serves.
20
At least, this is the most commonly given explanation.
A generally frank Soviet specialist on Afghanistan told the author
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that Gulabzoi's exile had lo do with "personal problems," rather
than political conflict.
21
While valious exiled Islamists claim that they were first
to begin "jihad" against the Communists. the first actual armed
revolt against the government. in July 1978. took place in
Nulislan and had absolutely no connection to the exiles in
Pakistan. Other revolts, however. such as those in Badakhsan,
Herat. and Panjsher. appear to have been started by returning
Islamist exiles. See M. Nazif Shahrani, "Causes and Context of
Responses to the Saur Revolution in Badakhshan," in M. Nazif
Shahrani and Robert Canfield. Revolutions and Rebellions in
Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: University
of California Institute of International Studies. 1984). pp. 139169; Olivier Roy. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Camblidge University Press. 1986).
21
Sibghatullah had been implisoned for four years by
Daoud on charges of planning to assassinate Khrushchev duling
the latter's visit to Afghanistan in 1955. Mojaddedi had indeed
been a vocal opponent of the visit and the close relations with the
USSR that it cemented. but the truth of the specific charges is
questionable. Mojaddedi also studied in Egypt and had Muslim
Brotherhood contacts, but he did not seem to adopt the more
radical elements of their ideology and never claimed, for instance. that the pre-1978 (or at least pre-1973) governments of
Afghanistan were non-Islamic. He moved abroad after his release
from prison in 1959.
'"According to Roy. Islam and Resistance, this uprising
was organized by members of Jamiat-e Islami who had returned
clandestinely from exile in Iran and made contact with army
officers. who succeeded in seizing the garrison for several days.
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Mojaddedi. Mohammad!. and Sayyaf all became leaders
in this way.
"Sayyaf had been arrested in Kabul and was released
from Pol-e Charkhi Prison after the Soviet invasion. Although he
was a known activist of the Islamist movement. he apparently
escaped execution because he was a fellow tlibesman ofHafizullah Amin. Sayyafs oliginal name was Abd-ur-Rasul, meaning
servant of (or even worshipper o0 the Prophet. In lµie with
Wahhabi teachings. which oppose the attribution to Mohammad
of superhuman charactelistics. he changed his name to Abd-urRabb-ur-Rasul. meaning servant (worshipper) of the Master of
the Prophet.
•"This may be one of the reasons that only the Islamist
parties have significant presences north of the Hindu Kush. and
that their support there has increased throughout the war.
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"ln Persian, Ittehad-e Islami-ye Mujahidin Afghanistan,
often mistranslated as Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin. In
popular parlance, "Afghan" is still an ethnic term meaning
Pashtun. "Afghanistan" ls a more neutral geographical designauon.
•s'fhis changed to a certain extent by 1988. In some
provinces taken by mujahidin after lhe withdrawal of Soviet
troops. they established a transitional government based on a
shura of the commanders of the seven parties in the Alliance.
• 9 "Afghanistan: Declaration du Roi Zahir Chah," Le Moncie,
June 22, 1983.
30 Zahir Shah stated
that he had no interest in trying to
restore the monarchy, but Afghans know that his father had
similarly disavowed any interest in becoming king. In any case,
many believe that Abdul Wali, at least, ~ interested in restoring
the monarchy.
, ,National Reconciliation: Documents (Kabul: State Printing House. January 3, 1987).
a:tfhe civilian government of Pakistan led by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Juneja, as well as the U.S., however,
pref erred to go ahead and get the Soviets to sign ofT on their
commitment to withdraw without waiting for Afghans to reach
agreement about their future. They eventually dropped this
demand, and it did not affect the structure of the final agreement.
JuneJ o's efTectively cutting Zia out of the decision contributed to
Zia's decision to dismiss his government on May 29 and support
continued military aid to the mujahidin after May 15.
3
:ffhe population of Afghanistan is over 99 percent Muslim, and of the Muslims, about 20 percent are Shi'a. Most of the
Shi'a belong to the low-status Hazara ethnic group whose homeland is in the central highlands (Hazarajat) and furnish the
capital with much of its casual labor. The Peshawar alliance
consists of seven Sunni parties. There is an alliance of eight Shi'a
parties based in Teheran.
••"Un gouvemement introuvable," DefLSAjghans (February-June 1988). pp. 14-15.
""Notes used by Under-Secretary-General
Diego Cordovez, Representatiave of the Secretary-General, on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan during a Press
Conference held in Islamabad on Saturday 9 July 1988," mimeograph, p. 3.
'"The official, Benon Sevan, was promoted to Assistant
Secretary General in early 1989.
37
.Among the Islamists. Sayyaf and especially Khales are
known for being particularly anti-Shi ·a. Rabbani. on the con91

trary, is relatively tolerant and has even advocated recognition of
the Shfa ·s version of Islamic law (fiqh -e Ja 'afartyyal as valid for
disputes among the Shi'a.
3
•Richard Cronin ; "Afghanistan after the Soviet Withdrawal: Contenders for Power," Congressional Research Service,
May 1989.
3
•Qn the first day of the shu.ra Sayyaf announced these
appointments to the assembly. and there was no discussion or
vote . The next day the Afghan News Agency operated by
Hekmatyar's party with the aid of the Pakistani Jama 'at-i Islanu
reported that they had been "elected."
0
• Assefy,
who lives in Paris. is Zahir Shah's paternal
second cousin (he and Zahir Shah are both descended in direct
male line from a common great-grandfather). Zahir Shah's wife,
Humaira, is also Assefy's half-sister .
41
The proposed order of priority was: president: prime
minister; head of supreme court; defense; state security and
internal affairs; foreign affairs; reconstruction and education.
•"The Ministry of State Security was established only in
1986, when the Kabul government's KGB-trained secret police.
KhAD (the State Information Services) was upgraded from a
department of the Prime Minster's office to a separate ministry.
Some in the resistance had advocated abolishing it and restoring
all internal security and law enforcement functions to the
Ministry of Internal Alfairs, but the shura did not discuss this
issue.
<STheISi locked the doors of the hall during the voting, but
several of the expatriates nonetheless managed to walk out.
Others ref used to attend. They protested that the outcome did
not represent the will of the Afghan people or even the muj ahidin
but of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia .
..The claim was not really inaccurate. but it did not have
the meanings that many might infer from it. Most areas of rural
Afghanistan were and are under the de facto control of local
mujahidin more or less affiliated with the exiled parties. The
parties, however, exercise no administrative control over the
local groups. Furthermore, since the mujahidin by and large still
do not have either heavy weapons capable of destroying wellfortified positions or effective defenses against air power. the
government is able to maintain and supply a network of garrisons as well as to attack virtually any point where something
particularly threatening is occurring. such as a meeting of a rival
"government."
5
• Both Sudan
and Malaysia are countries with Muslim
majorities and strong non-Islamic minorities. Both also have
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growing Wahhabi-influenced Islamic revival movements . The
recognition of the Afghan government was a political concession
to the Islamistgroups in both countries that was politically easier
to implement than the enactment of shari'a legislation.
••Another interpretation is that what has here been called
the policy of Pakistan or the ISi is in fact the policy of the CIA.
which has managed to stay behind the scenes . In this view. U.S.
policy is not the captive of the ISI. but of the CIA The author has
no evidence one way or the other .
•7The most prominent Afghan to have endorsed this
position . is Jamil -ur-Rahman. leader of a Wahhabi group in
Kunar . Jamil-ur-Rahman's group (Jama'at-ud-Da 'awa al-Quran
wa Ahl-ul -Hadith) is independent of the seven alliance parties
and receives direct aid from private Wahhabi sources. There are
several hundred Arabs fighting with his group who have been
charged by the Afghans with slaughter of captured government
militia members. rape. and trafficking in women.
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